To super patriots, Italy’s gains at the peace treaties ending the war were insufficient reward for her sacrifices and merely confirmed their scorn for the politicians. They yearned for a strong man, tied to no special interest groups, who could promote the real interests of the nation. Such a leader they found in Mussolini, who had consistently criticized the treaty system, calling for revision and fairer treatment for the “have-not” states like Italy.

But during the 1920s there was little that Mussolini could do to advance the national interest abroad. The pendulum policy of playing one group of powers off against the other did not work in the  immediate post-war period. With Germany and Soviet Russia desperately weakened by war, revolution, and economic collapse, the only remaining block of powers was the victorious Entente, to which Italy
belonged. Yet her allies had proved ungenerous at the peace conference. Moreover, there was little scope for action in Central Europe and the Balkans, where Italy might have hoped to gain influence. France seemed dominant there. She had encouraged the formation of the Little Entente  -- Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia -- to which she became tied in 1924 when she made an
alliance with Czechoslovakia.

This left Italy little leverage and little opportunity. Italy was invited to  participate in the Locarno Agreements (1925) and this confirmed her status as one of the European powers. But it also put her on record as defending the treaty system, which Mussolini was determined to revise. Italy got an opportunity to flex her muscles against Greece in the Corfu Incident (1923), and she negotiated the
cession of Fiume from Yugoslavia (1924). Although popular, neither of these brought real power or prestige to Italy. Her recognition of the Soviet Union (1924) failed to establish a counter-weight to the Entente powers or to provide a viable trade partner. 

For the rest, Mussolini was left to try to undermine France’s position in Central Europe by courting influence in Austria and Hungary -- both defeated states, interested in revising the treaty system -- and by sponsoring Croat separatism as a means of weakening Yugoslavia.

All of this was to change rapidly after Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany on 30 January 1933. He rapidly consolidated power and swiftly brought Germany out of the Depression. With Germany’s rising  strength and Hitler’s avowed goal of breaking “the chains” of the Versailles Treaty, here was a valid counter-weight to France and Britain.

It was by no means a foregone conclusion that Mussolini would eventually line up with Hitler and Nazi Germany. Indeed, Mussolini was initially scornful of Hitler. But France and Britain  responded weakly to Hitler’s challenges to the treaty system, apparently confirming Mussolini’s frequent assertions that parliamentary government was obsolete and decadent.  There were major differences between Fascism and Nazism, but the similarities were more numerous. And both were openly revisionist, devoted to
restructuring power relations in Europe. Although not inevitable, it was certainly understandable that Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany would gravitate more closely to each other. 

As they did, Italy fell increasingly under the domination of her more powerful neighbor to the north. This meant involvement in the Second World War and Italy’s ruin. 

The lectures for this week will deal more deeply with the diplomacy of Fascist Italy, the drift to war, and Italy’s wartime experience.