Journal Articles:
- “Positive Illusions, Perceived Control, and the Free Will Debate,” with Tatyana Matveeva (a Dickinson College undergrad). Forthcoming in Mind & Language.
- “Natural Compatibilism vs. Natural Incompatibilism: Back to the Drawing Board,” with Adam Feltz and Edward Cokely. Forthcoming in Mind & Language.
- “Temperament and Intuition: A Commentary on Feltz and Cokely” with Trevor Kvaran and Eddy Nahmias. Forthcoming in Consciousness and Cognition.
- “The Actor-Observer Bias and Moral Intuitions: Adding Fuel to Sinnott-Armstrong’s Fire,” with Adam Feltz. Neuroethics 1:2 (2008) 133-144.
- “Folk Intuitions, Slippery Slopes, and Necessary Fictions: An Essay on Smilansky’s Free Will Illusionism,” with Adam Feltz. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13:1 (2007): 202-213.
- “The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy,” with Eddy Nahmias. Philosophical Explorations 10:2 (2007): 123-149.
- “Fringe Benefits, Side Effects, and Intentional Actions: A Reply to Feltz.” The Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27:1 (2007): 801-809.
- “Foresight, Moral Considerations, and Intentional Actions.” The Journal of Cognition and Culture 6:1 (2006): 133-158.
- “On Trying to Save the Simple View.” Mind & Language 21:5 (2006): 565-586.
- “Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?” with Eddy Nahmias, Steven Morris, and Jason Turner. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73:1 (2006): 28-53.
- “Bad Acts, Blameworthy Agents, and Intentional Actions: Some Problems for Jury Impartiality.” Philosophical Explorations 9:2 (2006): 203-220.
- “Surveying Free Will: Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility,” with Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, and Jason Turner. Philosophical Psychology 18:5 (2005): 561-584.
- “Skill, Luck, Control, and Intentional Action.” Philosophical Psychology 18:3 (2005): 343-354.
- “The Butler Problem Revisited.” Analysis 64:3 (2004): 277-284.
- “The Phenomenology of Free Will,” with Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, & Jason Turner. The Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (2004): 162-179.
- “Praise, Side Effects, and Intentional Action.” The Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2004): 196-213.
- “On Implicit Testability as a Necessary Condition for Philosophical Explanations.” Philosophical Writings 27 (2004): 3-14.
Book Chapters:
- “Criminal Law, Philosophy, and Psychology: Working at the Cross-roads.” Forthcoming in The Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Law, edited by Leslie Green and Brian Leiter (Oxford University Press).
- “The Threat of Shrinking Agency and Free Will Disillusionism.” Forthcoming in Benjamin Libet and Agency, edited by Lynn Nadel and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Oxford University Press).
- “The Knobe Effect Revisited.” Forthcoming in A. Buckareff, J. Aguilar, and K. Frankish (eds.), Action Theory: New Waves in Philosophy (Palgrave-Macmillan).
Reviews & Commentaries:
